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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The state appeals from the district court's order granting Robert D. 
Critchfield's motion for a new trial. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In June 2008, a 12-year-old Couer d'Alene girl reported to police that her 
neighbor, Robert Critchfield, touched her inappropriately over a period of four to 
six months. (R., Vol. I, pp.32-35, 41-42, 67.) The girl also told police that 
Critchfield had exposed her to pornography, and had called her, along with other 
neighborhood girls, into his bedroom while he was masturbating. (Id.) Over the 
next few days, police spoke to approximately eight other neighborhood girls who 
made similar allegations against Critchfield. (R., Vol. I, pp.35-68.) 
After several amendments to the information, the state ultimately charged 
Critchfield with seven counts of sex abuse, and two counts of lewd and lascivious 
conduct. (R., Vol. III, pp.509-512.) The charges involved nine separate victims. 
(Id.) At trial, the state called, in total, nine witnesses - the nine victims. (Trial Tr., 
p.95, L.5 - p.535, L.9.) No law enforcement officers or state experts testified, 
and no audio recordings of the investigators' victim interviews were admitted into 
evidence. (See generally, Trial Tr.) 
During Critchfield's case-in-chief, he attempted to call expert witness Dr. 
Gregory Wilson. (Trial Tr., p.901, Ls.10-22.) According to Critchfield's offer of 
proof made during the trial, Dr. Wilson would have testified about proper 
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protocols that law enforcement officers should employ when interviewing child 
victims of sex abuse, and about the risk of improper suggestion in such 
interviews if those protocols are not followed. (R., Vol. III, pp.563-564; Trial Tr., 
p.1412, L.12 - p.1440, L.8.) Further, Dr. Wilson would have specifically critiqued 
the victim interviews conducted by law enforcement officers in this case. (Id.) 
Following the state's objection, and argument over several days, the 
district court excluded Dr. Wilson's testimony. (Trial Tr., p.901, L.10 - p.909, L.9; 
p.1110, L.20 - p.1149, LA; p.1179, L.24 - p.1202, L.8.) The court determined 
that because none of the law enforcement officers who conducted the interviews 
testified at trial, and because the content of the interviews was not in evidence, 
such testimony was irrelevant and invaded the province of the jury. (ld.) 
The jury found Critchfield guilty of one count of sex abuse, and one count 
of lewd and lascivious conduct. (R., Vol. III, p.551.) The jury acquitted Critchfield 
of four of the sex abuse counts. (R., Vol. III, pp.551-552.) The district court 
declared a mistrial on the three remaining counts, after the jury was unable to 
reach unanimous verdicts on those counts. (R., Vol. III, pp.551-552, 579-580.) 
Critchfield then filed a motion for a new trial. (R., Vol. III, pp.560-565; 571-
578.) Among other grounds, Critchfield requested a new trial on the basis of the 
district court's exclusion of Dr. Wilson's testimony. (Id.) The district court 
granted Critchfield's motion, determining that it was error to exclude Dr. Wilson's 
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testimony at trial. (R., Vol. III, pp.591-592; 12/16/10 Tr., p.53, L.23 - p.63, L.9.) 
The state timely appealed. (2/10/11 State's "Notice of AppeaL") 1 
1 Simultaneous with the filing of this brief, the state has filed a motion to augment 
the record with the 2/10/11 Notice of Appeal. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion in granting a new trial because no 
reversible error occurred in the trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Granting Critchfield's Motion For A 
New Trial 
A. Introduction 
At trial, the district court properly excluded the testimony of proffered 
defense expert Dr. Wilson, who would have discussed child sex abuse victim 
interview protocols, and critiqued the interviews conducted by law enforcement 
officers in this case. Because none of the law enforcement officers who 
interviewed the victims testified at trial, and because the interviews themselves 
were not in evidence, such testimony would have necessarily amounted to an 
improper determination of trial witness credibility, and invaded the province of the 
jury. The district court therefore abused its discretion in later finding an error of 
law in its exclusion of the testimony, and in granting Critchfield's motion for a new 
tria!. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Granting or denying a motion for a new trial is within the district court's 
discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion is abused. 
State v. Jones, 127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 (1995); State v. Pugsley, 
119 Idaho 62, 63, 803 P.2d 563, 564 (Ct. App. 1991). 
C. The District Court Erred In Granting Critchfield's Motion For A New Trial 
Idaho law permits a district court to order a new trial if the court has "erred 
in the decision of any question of law arising during the course of the tria!." I.C. § 
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19-2406(5). Idaho Criminal Rule 34 outlines the standard that the trial court 
applies when considering a motion for a new trial, directing that "[t]he court ... 
may grant a new trial to the defendant if required in the interest of justice." 
Whether the interests of justice require a new trial is a question that is committed 
to the discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be disturbed absent a 
showing of manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Armstrong, 142 Idaho 62, 64, 
122 P.3d 321, 323 (Ct. App. 2005). When a district court orders a new trial 
based on I.C. § 19-2406(5), a reviewing appellate court will determine first 
whether the evidentiary ruling at trial in question was erroneous, and, if so, 
whether that error was harmless, i.e., whether the Court is confident beyond a 
reasonable doubt that, had the evidentiary error not occurred, the verdict would 
have been the same. State v. Howell, 137 Idaho 817, 820-821, 54 P.3d 460, 
463-464 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing State v. Roberts, 129 Idaho 194, 923 P.2d 439 
(1996)). Therefore, a district court manifestly abuses its discretion if it orders a 
new trial pursuant to I.C. § 19-2406(5), if either: (1) the evidentiary ruling at trial 
in question was not erroneous, or (2) the evidentiary ruling at trial in question was 
erroneous, but the error was harmless. 
1. The District Court's Exclusion Of Dr. Wilson's Testimony At Trial Was 
Not Erroneous 
Expert testimony is admissible if it "assist[s] the trier of fact to understand 
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." State v. Joslin, 145 Idaho 75,81, 
175 P.3d 764, 770 (2007) (quotations omitted); see also LR.E. 702; However, 
"Idaho courts have routinely held that an expert's opinion, in a proper case, is 
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admissible up to the pOint where an expression of opinion would require the 
expert to pass upon the credibility of witnesses or the weight of disputed 
evidence. To venture beyond that point, however, is to usurp the jury's function. 
It is the jury's function to assess the demeanor of the witnesses and make a 
determination of credibility." State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 525, 81 P.3d 1230, 
1235 (2003) (citing State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 696, 760 P.2d 27, 35 (1988); 
State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410, 419, 3 P.3d 535, 544 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. 
Allen, 123 Idaho 880, 885, 85 P .2d 625, 630 (Ct. App. 1993)). Further, 
"statements by a witness as to whether another witness is telling the truth are 
prohibited." Perry, 139 Idaho at 525, 81 P.3d at 1235 (quoting Allen, 123 Idaho 
at 885, 853 P.2d at 630.) 
In this case, as the district court initially concluded, Critchfield's proffered 
expert testimony would have necessarily and improperly commented on the 
credibility of the testifying victims, and invaded the province of the jury. The 
interviews themselves were not in evidence, none of the law enforcement officers 
who conducted the interviews testified at trial, and the state did not call any 
expert witnesses to discuss either the interviews specifically, or child sex abuse 
victim interviews generally. Critchfield, in essence, was not seeking to utilize Dr. 
Wilson's testimony to simply "assist" the jurors in their evaluation of the 
interviews, as permitted by I.R.E. 702, he was seeking to implore the jurors to 
conclude, based solely on Dr. Wilson's expert testimony, that the interviews were 
not only improperly suggestive, but actually caused the witnesses to testify 
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falsely at trial. The district court correctly determined that this would be 
impermissible. 
It is true that in other jurisdictions there is an emerging trend to allow 
defense experts to describe proper methods that should be used to interview 
child sex abuse victims, and to critique law enforcement interviews that fall short 
of these standards. See State v. Wigg, 889 A.2d 233, 239 (Vt. 2005) 
(recognizing that "a large majority of courts have held that the type of general 
expert evidence introduced in this case, explaining the proper and improper 
methods of examining children who may be victims of sexual assault, is 
admissible") (citations omitted). However, these cases typically analyze the 
admissibility of this type of defense expert testimony in terms of rebutting state 
expert testimony regarding the procedures actually used in the interviews in 
question, or as a tool to explain and provide assistance to juries in their analysis 
of recordings or other evidence of interviews actually admitted into evidence. In 
other words, these cases have held that defense experts may provide expert 
opinions to assist jurors in analyzing victim interviews that are, in some way, 
actually in evidence. See,~, State v. Sloan, 912 S.W.2d 592, 594-599 (Mo. 
App. E.D. 1995) (State officials testified at trial about the victim interviews they 
conducted, and about their training and experience to conduct such interviews. 
The U[d]efendant offered to prove [that these state officials], gave testimony that 
was not probative of guilt because they used faulty techniques or methods in 
dealing with the child."); State v. Gersin, 668 N.E.2d 486, 487-489 (Ohio 1996) 
(recognizing that the deputy who conducted the victim interview testified at trial, 
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and that "prosecution witnesses relied upon [victim's] interviews in their 
testimony"); Barlow v. State, 507 S.E.2d. 416, 417-419 (Ga. 1998) ("Indeed, the 
State in this case clothed the [victim] interviewer with expertise by eliciting 
testimony that he had extensive experience and training in investigating child 
sexual abuse and interviewing the victims thereof. Thus, as Barlow correctly 
observes, the exclusion of his expert's testimony produced an 'uneven playing 
field.' Allowing expert opinion testimony that the police detective in this case 
used improper interview techniques 'represent[ed] a direct response to expert 
opinion offered by the state."') (citations omitted); u.S. v. Rouse, 111 F.3d 561, 
570-572 (8th Cir. 2001) (FBI agent who conducted victim interviews testified at 
trial); Pyron v. State, 514 S.E.2d 51, 52-54 (Ga. App. 1999) (the state tendered a 
videotape of victim interview into evidence); State v. Sargent, 738 A.2d 351, 352-
354 (N.H. 1999) (The defendant cross-examined victim witnesses with evidence 
that they had delayed disclosure of the abuse, made inconsistent statements, 
and recanted prior statements. The state then called an expert witness to 
discuss child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome, and to address the 
subjects raised on cross-examination of the victims. The defendant then sought 
to call an expert to rebut the state expert, specifically by discussing the danger of 
improperly-conducted interviews of children.); State v. Hakala, 763 N.W.2d 346, 
348, 350-353 (Minn. App. 2009) ("The social worker testified about her training 
for interviewing children who have allegedly been sexually abused, as well as the 
proper protocol for interviewing such children. She concluded by discussing her 
interviews with the alleged victims here. In addition to live testimony by the 
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victims, the taped interviews between the social worker and the victims were also 
played for the jury."); See also State v. Hulbert, 481 N.W.2d 329, 330-334 (Iowa 
1992) (Where officials who conducted victim interviews testified, but the 
interviews themselves were not in evidence, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in disallowing defense expert from specifically critiquing procedures 
used in interviewing the victims. "The court could reasonably conclude that 
without the interview in evidence, there was no fact in issue that [the defense 
expert's] testimony would aid the jury in better understanding.") (Citation 
omitted). 
Thus, while defendants may be permitted to call expert witnesses to assist 
the jury in making credibility determinations from evidence actually admitted at 
trial, or to rebut state witness testimony from experts and law enforcement 
officials that conducted the interviews, it does not follow that a defendant may 
utilize a defense expert to testify, in the absence of such evidence, that victim 
interviews were suggestive. Such testimony necessarily invades the province of 
the jury. 
In this case, Critchfield, despite having subpoenaed the police officers 
who conducted the victim interviews, and arranging for them to be at the 
courthouse during the trial (Trial Tr., p.826, Ls.1 0-13), elected not to call them as 
witnesses. Critchfield also declined to move to suppress the victim testimony on 
the grounds that it was tainted by improper suggestion. Finally, he also declined 
to attempt to have admitted, as evidence, audio recordings of the actual victim 
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interviews. 2 Instead, Critchfield elected to attempt to present to the jury only Dr. 
Wilson's testimony that the police interviews were flawed. 3 Such testimony 
would be useful for no other purpose than to persuade the jurors to conclude that 
the witnesses testified falsely, based on nothing more than the expert's 
testimony. Faced with Dr. Wilson's testimony, but no interview evidence upon 
which to apply it, the jury would have two choices. It could either disregard Dr. 
Wilson's testimony and rely on its own credibility determinations, or it could have 
blindly accepted his conclusions and inferred that the victims testified falsely at 
2 Critchfield did submit transcripts of the interviews, which he had created from 
the interview audio recordings, as part of his offer of proof. (Trial Tr., p.1437, 
Ls.11-19; Defendant's Exhibit 8.) Even if Dr. Wilson had testified, however, 
Critchfield would not have been able to authenticate or lay proper foundation for 
admission of the interview transcripts or audio recordings through him. 
Critchfield would, however, likely have been able to admit the recordings through 
the police officers who had conducted the interviews. See Jenkins v. 
Commonwealth, 308 S.W.3d 704, 713 (Ky. 2010) (recognizing, in dicta, that trial 
court erred by denying the defendant's motion to admit recordings of the victim 
interview during defense cross-examination of the officer who conducted the 
interview). 
3Critchfield's decision to attempt to rely solely on Dr. Wilson's defense expert 
testimony may have been based on his perception of the state's lack of 
preparation to rebut such testimony. In addition to its relevance objection, the 
state objected to Dr. Wilson's testimony on the grounds of late and improper 
disclosure. (Trial Tr., p.901, L.10 - p.902, L.17, p.1117, L.7 - p.1121, L.11.) 
Critchfield did not disclose Dr. Wilson as a witness until two weeks prior to trial, 
and never provided the state, or the district court, information about the 
anticipated content of Dr. Wilson's testimony until after he was called as a 
witness. (ld.) Critchfield argued that the disclosure was sufficiently timely, and 
that the state never specifically requested that Critchfield disclose the content of 
Dr. Wilson's expert testimony pursuant to I.C.R. 16(7). (Trial Tr., p.904, L.4 -
p.906, L.2, p.1121, L.12 - p.1125, L.17.) Because the district court excluded Dr. 
Wilson's testimony on relevance grounds, it did not rule on the state's discovery 
objection. 
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trial. Admission of such evidence would thus clearly invade the province of the 
jury. 
2. Even If The District Court's Evidentiary Ruling That Excluded Dr. 
Wilson's Testimony At Trial Was Erroneous, Such Error Was Harmless 
As discussed above, a district court manifestly abuses its discretion when 
it grants a motion for a new trial based on an error of law at trial pursuant to I.C. § 
19-2406(5), when any such trial error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Howell, 137 Idaho at 820-821,54 P.3d at 463-464; Roberts, 129 Idaho at 197-
199, 923 P.2d at 442-444. In this case, even if the district court should have 
permitted Dr. Wilson to testify at trial, any error in the exclusion of Dr. Wilson's 
testimony was harmless. 
Should this Court find that Dr. Wilson should have been permitted to 
testify generally about proper protocols that should be used in interviewing child 
sex abuse victims, but not offer specific critiques of the interviews conducted in 
this case, then such error is clearly harmless. In such an instance, the jury would 
be left with expert opinion about proper interview protocols, but little or no 
information about what protocols were actually used in this case (as discussed 
above, such evidence would also be irrelevant, for similar reasons). 
If instead, this Court finds that Dr. Wilson should have been permitted to 
testify generally about proper interview protocols, as well as offer specific 
critiques of the interviews conducted in this case, the jury still would not have 
been able to utilize his testimony to analyze the respective victim interviews 
directly. Having convicted Critchfield on counts I and III (victims D.L.M. and 
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K.R.S.), acquitted him on counts V, VII, VIII, and IX (victims AM.L., M.L.B., 
C.R.D., and D.AG.), and failed to reach unanimous verdicts on counts II, IV, and 
VI (victims I.M.L., H.A, and K.M.T.) (R., Vol. III, pp.509-512, 551-552), the jury 
necessarily made credibility determinations in favor of some of the victims, and 
against others, based on their testimony. It is unlikely the jury would have 
abandoned its credibility-finding role entirely, and relied exclusively on the 
testimony of Dr. Wilson to collectively acquit, or fail to reach a verdict, on all nine 
charges, involving nine separate victims. 
At trial, the district court properly concluded that the testimony of Dr. 
Wilson was inadmissible. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion when 
it incorrectly determined that this original ruling constituted an error of law, and 
granted Critchfield's motion for a new trial. Even if the district court should have 
permitted Dr. Wilson to testify, such error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt in light of the lack of evidence the jury had at its disposal with which to 
utilize the testimony. This Court should therefore reverse the district court's 
order granting Critchfield's motion for a new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
order granting Critchfield's motion for a new trial, reinstate the impacted verdicts, 
and remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this 14th day of November 2011. 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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